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Abstract. This paper presents a system for classifying e-mails into two 
categories, legitimate and fraudulent. This classifier system is based on the 
serial application of three filters: a Bayesian filter that classifies the textual 
content of e-mails, a rule- based filter that classifies the non grammatical 
content of e-mails and, finally, a filter based on an emulator of fictitious 
accesses which classifies the responses from websites referenced by links 
contained in e-mails. This system is based on an approach that is hybrid, 
because it uses different classification methods, and also integrated, because it 
takes into account all kind of data and information contained in e-mails. This 
approach aims to provide an effective and efficient classification. The system 
first applies fast and reliable classification methods, and only when the resulting 
classification decision is imprecise does the system apply more complex 
analysis and classification methods.  
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1   Introduction 
Phishing is the term used to describe massive e-mails that trick recipients into 
revealing their personal or company confidential information, such as social security 
and financial account numbers, account passwords and other identity or security 
information. These e-mails request the user’s personal information as a client of a 
legitimate entity with a link to a website that looks like the legitimate entity’s website 
or with a form contained in the body of the e-mail. The aim of phishing is to steal a 
user’s identity in order to make fraudulent transactions as if the phisher were the user. 
According to Anti-Phishing Working Group [9] the number of phishing reports 
increased from 20,109 in May 2006 to 28,571 in June 2006 to make it the most ever 
recorded. Phishing attacks are increasing despite of the use of e-mail filters. Although 
only 0.001 percent of these e-mails sent are answered, this percentage is enough to 
provide a return on investment and keep the phishing industry alive [26].   
The next section reviews different filter types currently available. Section 3 gives 
details of the anti-phishing system proposed. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
evaluation of this approach. Section 5 focuses on the learning ability of the system, 
and the final section presents the conclusions and point the way to future work on this 
subject. 
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2   Phishing Filtering  
Information on techniques for avoiding electronic fraud is not readily available in the 
scientific and marketing literature. This lack of information prevents phishers from 
hitting upon for the circumvention of filters.  
Nowadays, although different systems exist to deal with the problem of electronic 
fraud, these systems are far from optimal for classification purposes. The methods 
underlying these systems can be classified into two categories, depending on the part 
of the message chosen by the filter as the focus for deciding whether e-mail messages 
are legitimate or fraudulent: 
1. Origin-based filtering. Origin-based filters focus on the source of the e-mail and 
verify whether this source is on a white verification list [8] or on a black verification 
list [1], [29].  
2. Content-based filters focus on the subject and body of the e-mail. These can be 
also divided into two classes, depending on whether the analyzed content is textual or 
non-textual. Textual content filters classify e-mails using Bayesian classifiers [2], [7], 
[10], heuristic rules [23], [28] or a combination of them [10]. Non-textual content 
filters examine the links embedded in e-mails by different techniques. Some filters 
check whether the links belong to white and black verification lists [6], [10]. Other 
filters analyze the appearance of the alphanumeric string of links and look for well 
known phishing schemes [14], [15]. In [4], a combination of internal and external 
information relative to both textual content and links in e-mails is used to build an 
effective e-mail filter. 
Besides the phishing e-mail filters, there exist other anti-phishing tools, the 
toolbars, which can be built into browsers for blocking access to or warning the user 
about web pages identified as possible or actual phish. Examples of these web filters 
are [5], [16], [25]. In [18] a comparative test of several toolbars is shown. 
Most current commercial e-mail filters use verification lists to analyze e-mail 
senders and links contained in the body of e-mails. These filters are dynamic and 
update verification lists when new attacks are reported. However, the updating rate of 
filters is often overcome by the changing rate of the attacks because phishing e-mails 
are continuously modifying senders and link strings, many websites are only available 
one day, and continuous updating thus implies a high economic cost. 
This paper describes a client-side system, which was designed and built to detect 
and filter phishing e-mail automatically, using different sources of information 
present in the content of e-mails which are handled by the processing methods most 
suitable for each information type.  
3   Classification System 
The range of procedures used by a phisher, which evolve quickly in order to evade 
filters available, makes it necessary to solve the problem of identifying phishing e-
mails with a multistrategy and integrated approach. The system shown in this paper 
focuses on a global view of all the information provided by an e-mail and the different 
analysis methods for each kind of information.  
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One main feature of this system is effectiveness, measured by precision 
(percentage of predicted documents for a category that are correctly classified) and 
recall (percentage of documents for a category that are correctly classified), because it 
applies three different classifiers in order to obtain all the information needed at each 
decision point to classify an e-mail serially. Another relevant feature is efficiency, 
because the order in which the classifiers are applied aims to obtain fast and reliable 
classifications by minimizing the resources used in a first classification step and then, 
if it is necessary,  more complex methods are used in following classification steps.  
The system decides to assign an e-mail to the Fraud or Legitimate categories after 
applying first, a Naïve Bayes classifier that focuses on the textual content of e-mails 
and assigns them to the Economic or Non-Economic categories. It should be 
highlighted that it is very difficult to obtain financial legitimate e-mails because 
neither the financial sector nor users give their legitimate economic e-mails to 
generate legitimate economic corpuses that can be analyzed by the scientific 
community. Besides, the non-on-line financial entities are reluctant to use such means 
primarily due to the growing number of phishing attacks. This lack makes it difficult 
to train Bayesian classifiers that discriminate between the Legitimate and Fraud 
categories according to the textual content of e-mails. This is the reason for training 
both Bayesian classifiers on a corpus of e-mails labeled into the Economic and Non-
Economic categories.  
Next, a rule-based classifier, which focuses on non grammatical features of e-
mails, classifies e-mails previously assigned to the Economic category by the first 
classifier into one of the Legitimate, Fraud or Suspicious categories. Last, a third 
classifier emulates a fictitious access to websites referenced by links contained in the 
body of the e-mails assigned to the Suspicious category by the rule-based classifier. 
This classifier analyzes the responses obtained from the fictitious access to these 
websites and classifies them into the Fraud or Legitimate categories. 
The system includes a bias against generating false negatives, i.e., e-mails 
erroneously classified in the Legitimate category, and false positives, i.e., e-mails 
erroneously classified in the Fraud category. When a classifier lacks information at 
some decision point, the classifier assigns the e-mail to the category that allows the 
system to further analyze the e-mail at a deeper level. The bias tries to enforce the 
user’s safety against false negatives and classification performance of the system 
against false positives. Although the outcome from wrongly classifying an e-mail as 
legitimate is more dangerous for the user than classifying an actual legitimate e-mail 
as fraudulent, the system takes into account both kinds of misclassifications. 
The system can learn incrementally from past mistakes when the user prompts 
misclassified e-mails by an interface that shows the final classification results. The 
architecture of this classifier system is modular and flexible. This easily allows new 
analysis and detection methods to be added as they are developed. 
3.1   Naïve Bayes Classifier for the Textual Content of E-mails 
This classifier was developed to identify and filter e-mail based on the Naïve Bayes 
statistical classification model [12], [21]. Since there are two parts in an e-mail, 
subject and body, which can contain text, a Bayesian classifier is built for each part. 
In the training stage, the probabilities for each word conditioned to each category are 
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estimated, and a vocabulary of words with their associated probabilities is created. 
The filter classifies a new text into a category by estimating the probability of the text 
for each possible category Cj, defined as P (Cj | text) = P (Cj) . Πi P (wordi | Cj), 
where wordi represents each word contained in the text to be classified. Once these 
computations have been performed, the Bayesian classifier assigns the text to the 
category that has the highest probability value.  
In the classification phase of a new e-mail, the Bayesian classifier composes a 
word vector associated with each part of the e-mail and computes the economic 
probability Pec and non-economic probability Pnec for each part. The parts are 
assigned to the category with the highest probability. The system integrates the 
classification decisions of both parts by assigning the e-mail to the Economic category 
whenever the classification result of any of the two parts is in the Economic category. 
This course of action claims to avoid generating false negatives. 
3.2   Rule-Based Classifier for the Non Grammatical Content of E-mails 
Since knowing whether an e-mail is economic is not sufficient to classify it into the 
Legitimate and Fraud categories, the goal of the system is only attained by analyzing 
other kinds of data contained in e-mails previously classified into the Economic 
category by the Bayesian classifier. This analysis aims to find out the values of the 
discriminatory features present in economic e-mails: links, images, and forms. An 
algorithm based on AQ learning [11] trained on a corpus of fraudulent and legitimate 
economic e-mails, which are represented by these three features, builds the 
descriptions and thus the rules for each category.  
The first rule states that if the body of an economic e-mail does not contain forms, 
images or links, then the e-mail is assigned to the Legitimate category. The second 
rule determines that an e-mail that requests information directly from a form 
contained in the body is not safe at all. Accordingly, the classifier categorizes all e-
mails dealing with economic topics and not offering any security when requesting 
personal information into the Fraud category. Since both fraudulent and legitimate e-
mails can contain images or links, these features do not determine with certainty the 
category of e-mails. In order to avoid generating false positives, the rule-based 
classifier uses a third rule to decide whether an e-mail is potentially dangerous to 
users. This rule states that if an e-mail deals with economic topics and it contains 
links in the text or links in an image, then the danger could come from the websites 
referenced by these links. So, the classifier classify the e-mail into the Suspicious 
category and a third classifier further processes the e-mail. An e-mail categorized as 
Suspicious is considered by the system lacking of knowledge to make a decision. 
Each rule has a dynamic confidence level. This confidence level can be modified as 
the system learns from misclassifications. 
3.3   A Classifier Based on an Emulator for the Content of Websites Addressed 
by the Links Contained in E-mails 
This classifier processes the links contained in the body of the e-mail and assigns a 
suspicious e-mail to the Legitimate or Fraud categories in a procedure consisting of 
three steps: 1) a meta-searcher extracts the structure of the websites addressed by 
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links, 2) an emulator fills in the website structure with fictitious data, and 3) a finite 
state automaton tries to recognize the answer given by the website. 
The meta-searcher is a procedure for obtaining the links contained in e-mails and 
extracting the patterns of the forms contained in the websites referenced by these 
links. First of all, the meta-searcher verifies whether the websites actually exist using 
an Internet search engine. Since fraudulent websites are available for a short period of 
time, this classifier determines that if there is no information about a website, then 
there is a high probability that the website is fraudulent. So, the e-mail that references 
this website is classified into the Fraud category. 
If the website exists, then the meta-searcher verifies that the accessed website uses 
a secure http connection (https). If a website is not safe, then the e-mail is classified 
into the Fraud category. If the website exists and it is safe, then the meta-searcher 
looks for the forms contained in the website and extracts all the fields that need to be 
filled in. The meta-searcher analyzes the kind of data of every field and detects 
whether a website requests sensitive information, like a password. If a website does 
not request personal information, then the meta-searcher determines that this website 
is legitimate and thus, the e-mail is classified into the Legitimate category.  
If a website requests personal information, then the emulator fills in the forms 
using fictitious data and then it submits the information in order to obtain the website 
response. At this point, the website response needs to be analyzed to know its nature 
and classify the e-mail. 
The classification model used for recognizing the response given by the website is 
based on the construction of a finite state automaton. The automaton represents words 
contained in a certain language and collects the grammar presented in this language. 
The language used in this case consists of the sentences contained in the responses 
given from legitimate financial websites to fictitious accesses. All of these responses 
warn the user of an error that occurred while processing the information requested by 
the website with a different vocabulary of words and a different grammar. The 
automaton is a generalized description of the instances of the class “legitimate 
responses to fictitious accesses”. Fictitious access to fraudulent websites return no 
error message since their sole goal is to collect users’ confidential information. This 
classification model allows a high degree of generalization in the classification and it 
is very efficient because it is not time-consuming and uses few resources. 
A grammar inference algorithm called ECGI [19] takes the sentences and the 
probabilities of all bigrams (groups of two words) and generates the automaton states 
and the edges between the states. Every edge connecting two states is weighted with 
the probability of the corresponding bigram. When the automaton is going to 
recognize a new sentence, the words of the sentence are processed according to their 
written order [22]. If there is a state representing the processed word and this state is 
reachable from the actual state, then the automaton follows that connection. If there is 
no state reachable representing the word, then the automaton follows the connection 
that has the highest probability. After following this connection, the automaton 
processes the next word. When the automaton reaches the final state, the automaton 
response is the sequence of words with the highest probability and similarity related 
to the sequence of words included in the sentence analyzed. 
The emulator-based classifier uses a function that computes the similarity between 
an input sentence and the sentence obtained by the automaton by calculating the 
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relation between the number of overlapping words in both sentences, and the total 
number of words in each sentence. If the minimum of the two percentages calculated 
is greater than or equal to 50%, then it is considered that the two sentences are 
similar. If the minimum is less than 50%, then the function computes the sum of the 
document frequency (the number of sentences contained in the base of responses 
which include that word) of the overlapping words in order to give a higher score to 
the words that appear in more sentences of the base of responses. If the sum of the 
document frequency of the overlapping words is greater than or equal to a threshold, 
whose value has been empirically determined, then the classifier considers that the 
two sentences are similar. If the sum is less than the threshold, then the sentences are 
not considered similar. 
Therefore, if the emulator-based classifier considers that a textual response 
obtained after a fictitious access is similar enough to the automaton response, then the 
textual response is considered legitimate. So the e-mail that references the website is 
classified into the Legitimate category. If the responses are not similar enough then 
the e-mail is classified into the Fraud category. 
4   Empirical Evaluation 
The classifier system was evaluated on a set of messages. This dataset is composed of 
1,038 economic messages, divided into 10 legitimate messages and 1,028 fraudulent 
messages, and 1,006 non-economic messages. A small fraction (4 e-mails) of the 
legitimate messages, i.e., economic messages coming from legitimate financial 
entities, and all non-economic messages were extracted from [24]. The remaining 
legitimate messages (6) were received by the authors of this paper during a given 
period of time. From 1,028 fraudulent economic messages, 833 were extracted from 
[13] and the remaining messages came from the inboxes of the authors of this paper. 
In the evaluation shown in this paper, messages from a sub corpus of [24] were 
carefully analyzed by hand for extracting the non-economic messages. Currently, the 
vocabulary of terms needed by the Bayesian filter for classifying messages into the 
economic or non-economic categories has been learned from the textual contents of 
two corpus of webpages dealing with economic topics and a third corpus dealing with 
general topics. 
The Bayesian classifiers were trained and tested on this dataset using 5-fold cross 
validation, that is, four folds were the training data and the fifth was the test data. The 
content of both textual parts of messages was preprocessed by applying a stop list, 
and stemming the words [17]. Next, words recurring below an experimentally 
determined threshold value of the function tf.idf [20] were removed. All words were 
sorted by the Chi-square statistical measurement [20] and only the 50% highest 
ranked words of the vocabulary of each part were retained. After that, both textual 
Bayesian classifiers were built. 
Table 1 shows the precision (Pr), recall (Rc) and F-measure (F) (F = (2 * precision 
* recall) / (precision + recall)) values obtained by the integration of both Bayesian 
classifiers for the Economic (E) and Non-Economic (N-E) categories. The last column 
presents the macro averaged values and the other five columns (Si) present the result 
of each execution of the cross validation. 
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Table 1. Performance measurements resulting from integrating the classifications obtained by 
the two textual Bayesian classifiers (Categories: Non-Economic N-E, Economic, E) 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 Average
Pr N-E 0.956 0.976 0.995 0.995 0.926 0.969 
Rc N-E 0.975 0.995 0.985 0.975 0.683 0.922 
F N-E 0.965 0.985 0.989 0.984 0.786 0.942 
Pr E 0.975 0.995 0.986 0.976 0.753 0.937 
Rc E 0.957 0.976 0.995 0.995 0.937 0.972 
F E 0.965 0.985 0.990 0.985 0.834 0.952 
A supervised learning algorithm trained on the fraudulent and legitimate e-mails of 
the dataset generated the decision rules for the Fraud, Legitimate and Suspicious 
categories. These rules were used to classify all the e-mails in the five folds which 
were previously categorized as Economic by the Bayesian classifier. In a first 
experimental setting, suspicious e-mails were classified in the Fraud class by default. 
The effectiveness values of this classifier for the Fraud (F) and Legitimate (L) 
categories is reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Performance measurements of the serial application of the Bayesian and rule-based 
classifiers (Categories: Fraud F, Legitimate L) 
Pr F Rc F F F Pr L Rc L F L 
0.941 0.949 0.944 0.943 0.921 0.930
In order for the system to make a confident decision about the class of a message, 
messages assigned to the Suspicious class were finally processed by the emulator-
based classifier. 
A base of responses was built to create the finite state automaton used by the 
emulator classifier. This base collects responses from different legitimate financial 
websites to fictitious accesses. These responses were preprocessed by using a stop list 
and a stemming algorithm [17]. The stemming algorithm does not reduce verbal 
endings that are used to determine verb tenses (“Introduce the information” is 
different from “The information introduced”). 
In the classification phase of the test responses, the classifier did not take the whole 
sentences obtained from accessing. Instead, it considered groups of three consecutive 
words. The choice of using groups of three words is based on the fact that most of the 
sentences included in the base of responses consisted of three words. 
Table 3. Performance measurements of the serial application of the Bayesian, rule-based and 
emulator-based classifiers (Categories: Fraud F, Legitimate L) 
Pr F Rc F F F Pr L Rc L F L 
0.962 0.948 0.955 0.949 0.962 0.955
 Detecting Phishing E-mails by Heterogeneous Classification 303 
The third classifier classifies the messages previously assigned to the Suspicious 
class by the rule-based classifier. Table 3 shows the overall performance 
measurements of the system for the Fraud (F) and Legitimate (L) categories. All 
effectiveness values are better than those obtained by only applying the Bayesian and 
the rule-based classifiers. The measurements indicate that this third classification step 
produces improvements of the precision value for the Fraud class and the recall value 
for the Legitimate class because it allows the system to classify more certainly the e-
mails containing links and thus to generate less false positives. 
5   Evolution of the System 
Fraudulent e-mails will continue to evolve in an attempt to evade the filters available. 
In order to prevent increased misclassification and, consequently, reduced 
classification performance, the system has to be able to learn from past mistakes. 
Classification errors can be of two types: 1) false positives or False Fraud, which are 
e-mails incorrectly classified as fraudulent when they are legitimate, and 2) false 
negatives or False Legitimate, which are fraudulent e-mails incorrectly classified as 
legitimate. 
As highlighted in previous sections, the system applies a bias that tries to protect 
users from the most dangerous error, the False Legitimate. Users are putting 
themselves at risk if they decide to access to an email classified into Legitimate class 
when it is actually Fraud. This is the reason why the system learning ability focuses 
on False Legitimate e-mails. When users identify a False Legitimate, they can prompt 
the e-mail misclassified by an interface designed for this purpose. The decision about 
this wrong classification can be caused by any of the three classifiers in the overall 
system. In order to know which classifiers are responsible for the misclassification, 
the system must save a classification track of the decisions taken by all the classifiers. 
Thus, the classifier that made the error can be identified. Depending on the classifier 
that wrongly decided, the learning ability differs: 
1) If the Bayesian classifiers assign an economic e-mail into the Non-Economic 
class, both vocabularies are updated in terms of the number of words and word 
probabilities associated with the economic and non-economic categories.  
2) The rule-based classifier assigns a fraudulent e-mail into the Legitimate class 
when there are no signs of danger present in this e-mail, i.e., the e-mail does not 
contain any form or link. In this instance, the classifier decreases the confidence level 
of the rules implied in the classification by an empirically determined amount. 
3) The emulator-based classifier assigns a suspicious e-mail to the Legitimate class 
when it is actually a fraudulent e-mail, because the automaton has not recognized 
correctly the responses to fictitious accesses to the websites referenced by the links 
contained in the suspicious e-mail. Here, learning implies that the sentences wrongly 
recognized by the automaton are added to a sentence stoplist. When the automaton 
receives a sentence, it verifies whether such sentence is included in the stoplist. If it 
is, the automaton does not process it and further analyzes the remaining sentences in 
the response. 
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6   Conclusions and Future Work 
The system presented in this paper is based on a hybrid approach that takes advantage 
of applying different processing methods to multiple data sources. It is an effective 
system for avoiding the creation of false positives and negatives. The major novelty 
comes from the emulator method used to classify the webpages addressed by the links 
contained in e-mails. The analysis of all kind of data present in e-mails allows the 
classification to be independent of external information sources, like verification lists 
or web reputation servers, leading to a more efficient decision making. 
Besides the learning capabilities of the system, thanks to its modular and flexible 
design, it does allow for straightforward upgrading as new processing methods 
become available or new features included in future phishing attacks can be 
identified. 
Currently, this approach is being easily extended to build webpage classifiers. 
Here, the webpage textual content is categorized as economic or non-economic by 
integrating the predictions made by several classifiers that categorize each one of the 
four possible textual parts (url, meta-text, plain-text, links) of a webpage [3]. If the 
webpage is economic and it contains forms requiring confidential information, the 
emulator fills in the forms with fictitious data and it submits them. Next, the answer 
obtained is analyzed and classified and accordingly the webpage is also categorized. 
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